Forest Conservation in US Climate Policy: An Interview with Jeff Horowitz

Introducing Jeff Horowitz and Avoided Deforestation Partners

As Congress debated comprehensive climate legislation and the world prepared for the Copenhagen climate summit, Jeff Horowitz was one of the most persistent and effective advocates for putting tropical forest conservation at the centre of US climate policy. The founder of Avoided Deforestation Partners (ADP), Horowitz assembled an unusual coalition in support of including tropical forest offsets in the Waxman-Markey bill — bringing together conservation groups, timber interests, and international development advocates around a shared economic and environmental argument.

We spoke with Horowitz about the state of the debate over forest conservation in US climate policy, the prospects for REDD+ in international negotiations, and what it would take to make tropical forest conservation a durable part of the American approach to addressing climate change.

What is Avoided Deforestation Partners and how did it come about?

"We started ADP because we saw an extraordinary opportunity — and an extraordinary risk. The opportunity was that for the first time in years, the US was seriously considering comprehensive climate legislation that could include a major role for tropical forest conservation. The risk was that without concerted advocacy from a broad coalition, the forest provisions could easily be left out or weakened to the point of irrelevance.

What we tried to do was build a coalition that went beyond the usual environmental suspects. We brought in the timber industry, which understood from its own experience how forests can be managed for multiple values. We brought in agricultural interests that saw sustainable land use in developing countries as consistent with their own goals. We brought in development groups that understood the poverty and governance dimensions of deforestation. That breadth was essential for making the case in Congress."

Waxman-Markey and the Forest Offset Provisions

What were the most important forest provisions in the Waxman-Markey bill, and how did they get there?

"The bill as passed by the House included provisions that would allow US companies to purchase international forest carbon offsets to meet a portion of their reduction obligations. This was significant because it created a direct financial mechanism connecting the US carbon market to tropical forest conservation — potentially channelling very large sums of money into forest protection in countries like Indonesia and Brazil.

Getting those provisions in required sustained engagement with the bill's authors and their staff, with relevant committee chairs, and with the administration. We had to make the case that forest offsets were environmentally credible — that the reductions would be real and measurable — and that they were economically rational, offering large emission reductions at costs below many domestic options. We also had to address concerns from some environmental groups who worried that offsets would allow domestic emitters to avoid making structural changes."

How did you address those concerns about offset integrity?

"The bill included serious provisions on monitoring, reporting, and verification. It required independent third-party verification of emission reductions, it required consistency with international accounting frameworks, and it set standards for additionality and permanence. These weren't perfect, but they were serious requirements that would have created a significant accountability framework.

The argument I always made was that the alternative to forest offsets wasn't a world where US companies made deeper domestic reductions — it was a world where tropical deforestation continued unabated while Congress focused only on domestic policy. Given that deforestation accounts for 15 to 20 percent of global emissions, the idea that we could solve the climate problem while ignoring it was simply not credible."

REDD+ in US Climate Policy: Opportunities and Challenges

How does US domestic climate legislation connect to the international REDD+ framework being developed under the UNFCCC?

"They're deeply interconnected. For REDD+ to work internationally, you need credible demand for forest carbon credits from compliance markets in major economies. Without that demand, the financial flows simply won't be large enough to compete with the economic incentives for deforestation. The US, as the world's largest economy and historically its largest emitter, is the most important source of potential demand.

Conversely, the development of international REDD+ standards and monitoring systems under the UNFCCC is essential for ensuring that US companies purchasing forest offsets can have confidence that the credits they buy represent real emission reductions. The two processes have to advance in parallel — you can't have US legislation that assumes an international verification framework that doesn't yet exist, but you also can't build that framework without the prospect of meaningful demand from the US market."

What are the biggest obstacles to making REDD+ work at the required scale?

"There are several, but I think the most fundamental is governance. In many tropical forest countries, the institutions, regulations, and enforcement capacity needed to manage forests sustainably are weak or compromised by corruption and conflicting interests. No amount of international financing will solve a deforestation problem that is fundamentally a governance problem.

The second big obstacle is the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. Many of the world's most important forest areas are traditional lands of indigenous groups whose rights are not legally recognised. If REDD+ payments flow to national governments without reaching the people who actually live in and manage those forests, the mechanism will fail both ethically and practically."

The Path Forward for Forest Conservation

What would success look like for tropical forest conservation in the context of US climate policy?

"Success would be a US climate law that creates substantial, reliable demand for high-quality international forest carbon offsets, backed by an international accounting framework with rigorous verification. It would mean billions of dollars per year flowing to tropical forest countries that are reducing deforestation — funding not just payments to governments but direct support for the communities who actually protect forests on the ground.

It would mean the US using its diplomatic influence to support governance reform in forest countries, to strengthen the rights of indigenous communities, and to reform the commodity markets that drive deforestation. And it would mean American consumers and companies taking responsibility for the forest footprint of the products they buy.

We're nowhere near that yet, but I believe it's achievable. The economic case is compelling, the science is clear, and there are champions in Congress who understand what's at stake. The question is whether we can build the political will to match the scale of the opportunity."

Frequently Asked Questions

Who is Jeff Horowitz and what is Avoided Deforestation Partners?+

Jeff Horowitz is the founder of Avoided Deforestation Partners (ADP), a Washington-based advocacy organisation that worked to include tropical forest conservation provisions in US climate legislation. Horowitz had a background in international environmental policy and became a leading voice in the campaign to ensure that the Waxman-Markey climate bill, which was moving through the US Congress in 2009 and 2010, would create financial incentives for protecting tropical forests as part of the US approach to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions.

Avoided Deforestation Partners brought together a diverse coalition of stakeholders — including conservation organisations, the timber industry, agricultural interests, and international development groups — around the shared goal of ensuring that reducing emissions from tropical deforestation would be a central component of US climate policy. This unlikely coalition was itself significant, as it demonstrated that forest conservation could be framed as a bipartisan and cross-sectoral issue rather than simply an environmental cause.

The organisation's work was grounded in the scientific evidence that reducing deforestation is one of the most cost-effective strategies available for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. By making this case in economic and policy terms accessible to legislators and their staff, ADP played an important role in shaping the forest provisions that were ultimately included in the Waxman-Markey bill as it passed the House of Representatives in June 2009.

Horowitz and ADP also engaged with international partners and the UNFCCC process, helping to bridge the gap between US domestic climate policy and the evolving international REDD+ framework. Their advocacy contributed to the broader understanding among US policymakers that tropical forest conservation was not merely an environmental luxury but a strategic priority for cost-effective climate mitigation.

What were the forest provisions in the Waxman-Markey climate bill?+

The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, commonly known as the Waxman-Markey bill after its authors in the House of Representatives, included significant provisions for international forest conservation as part of its broader cap-and-trade framework for reducing US greenhouse gas emissions. The bill passed the House in June 2009 but ultimately failed to advance in the Senate.

The forest provisions in Waxman-Markey would have allowed US companies covered by the cap-and-trade system to purchase carbon offsets generated by reducing deforestation in tropical countries. This would have created a direct financial link between the US compliance carbon market and international forest conservation, potentially channelling billions of dollars annually into tropical forest protection in countries like Indonesia, Brazil, and Congo.

The bill included provisions designed to ensure the environmental integrity of forest offset credits, including requirements for additionality, permanence, and independent verification. It also included provisions for international forest funds, bilateral forest agreements, and support for developing country capacity to monitor and report on forest carbon stocks. These elements reflected the understanding that international forest offsets could only deliver genuine climate benefits if they were underpinned by rigorous measurement and accountability systems.

The scale of forest offset allowances in the bill was a subject of considerable debate. Environmental groups concerned about the integrity of offsets argued that allowing unlimited use of forest credits could enable regulated emitters to avoid making structural changes to their operations. Supporters argued that the cost-effectiveness of forest conservation meant that generous offset allowances would be essential for securing the support of industry for the overall cap-and-trade framework.

Why did US climate legislation fail to advance after the House passage of Waxman-Markey?+

The failure of comprehensive climate legislation in the US Senate following the House passage of Waxman-Markey in June 2009 was a major setback for international climate ambitions, including the vision of a large-scale US-funded mechanism for tropical forest conservation. The Senate's failure to act reflected a combination of political, economic, and procedural obstacles that proved impossible to overcome during the 111th Congress.

The economic context of the 2008-2009 financial crisis and its aftermath made senators reluctant to support legislation that would impose costs on energy-intensive industries and raise energy prices for consumers. The oil and gas industry and electricity generators mounted a sustained campaign against cap-and-trade, framing it as a "job-killing" energy tax that would harm economic recovery. These arguments resonated in states with large fossil fuel industries or manufacturing sectors dependent on low energy costs.

The 2010 midterm elections, in which the Republican Party made large gains in the House and reduced the Democratic majority in the Senate, effectively ended the prospect for comprehensive climate legislation for the remainder of the Obama administration's first term. The new political landscape made it clear that a cap-and-trade system was no longer politically viable, and the administration pivoted to using existing regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act to address power sector emissions instead.

The collapse of US climate legislation had international repercussions that extended beyond forest conservation. The US failure to enact domestic climate legislation weakened the American negotiating position at international climate talks, including the Copenhagen summit in December 2009, and reduced leverage for pressing other major emitters to make binding commitments. It also eliminated what would have been a major source of demand for international forest carbon credits.

How does tropical forest conservation fit into US climate strategy?+

From a cost-effectiveness perspective, protecting tropical forests is among the most attractive options available for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. Studies consistently find that avoided deforestation can deliver large emissions reductions at costs per tonne of CO2 that are significantly below those of many domestic mitigation options in industrialised countries. This cost advantage makes international forest conservation an attractive complement to domestic emissions reduction policies.

Incorporating tropical forest conservation into US climate strategy also advances foreign policy and development objectives. Bilateral forest agreements with tropical forest countries can build relationships, support governance reform, advance biodiversity conservation, and help developing countries onto low-carbon development pathways. The Forest and Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Management Actions (FAA) and similar programmes have demonstrated that forest conservation can be a productive area of US international engagement.

The United States has been a significant funder of international forest conservation through bilateral aid programmes, contributions to multilateral forest funds including the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the UN-REDD Programme, and commitments made under the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference process. However, the scale of this funding has been far below what would be needed to address tropical deforestation at the scale required by climate science.

Domestic political obstacles to linking US carbon markets to international forest offsets have not disappeared. Concerns about the integrity of forest offsets, the displacement of emission reductions from domestic to international activities, and the verification challenges of measuring forest carbon at scale continue to be raised by critics. Addressing these concerns through rigorous standards and transparent monitoring remains a prerequisite for building the political support needed for large-scale US engagement in international forest conservation.

What progress has been made on REDD+ since the debates of 2009-2010?+

Since the debates over US climate legislation and the approach of the Copenhagen summit, international REDD+ has continued to develop and mature as a policy framework. The Cancun Agreements of 2010 established a comprehensive REDD+ framework under the UNFCCC, including decisions on safeguards, national forest monitoring, reference levels, and the phased approach to implementation. Subsequent COP decisions have elaborated on these elements and addressed issues including the treatment of non-carbon benefits.

Significant bilateral forest partnerships have been established between donor countries and tropical forest nations. Norway has been by far the largest bilateral donor, with major programmes in Indonesia, Brazil, Ethiopia, and other countries. The United Kingdom, Germany, and other European countries have also contributed significant funding through bilateral channels and multilateral forest funds. These investments have supported capacity building, policy reform, and in some cases delivered measurable emission reductions.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement has opened new possibilities for international carbon market mechanisms, including the potential for REDD+ credits to be used in compliance markets. The rules for these mechanisms, finalized at COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, establish a framework for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes that could eventually create large-scale demand for forest carbon. Realising this potential requires sustained engagement by both donor and recipient countries and the development of credible accounting systems.

The overall picture is one of significant institutional progress alongside persistent implementation challenges. The gap between international commitments and on-the-ground deforestation outcomes remains wide in many countries. Closing this gap requires addressing the fundamental governance and economic drivers of deforestation in ways that go beyond the financing mechanisms that REDD+ can provide on its own.