Binding Climate Change Deal Is Impossible After Barack Obama's Election Defeat, Says John Prescott

Prescott's Statement on Post-Election Climate Prospects

Former UK Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, one of the architects of the Kyoto Protocol and a veteran of decades of international climate negotiations, declared this week that a legally binding global climate deal has become effectively impossible in the aftermath of the Democratic Party's sweeping losses in the US midterm elections.

Speaking in the wake of results that handed control of the House of Representatives to the Republican Party and significantly narrowed the Senate majority, Prescott said that the political reality in Washington had fundamentally changed. "What happened on Tuesday makes a binding deal out of the question for the foreseeable future," he said. "Without the United States being able to make legal commitments that can pass Congress, you simply cannot construct a treaty that has the credibility and ambition that the climate crisis demands."

Prescott, who was directly involved in the negotiations at the Kyoto conference in 1997 that produced the only legally binding international climate treaty to date, drew parallels with the failure of the US Senate to ratify that agreement. "We've been here before. The world negotiated Kyoto in good faith with the United States at the table, and then the Senate refused to ratify it. The same dynamic is now playing out, but this time we don't even have a treaty to ratify."

The timing of Prescott's comments — just weeks before the Cancun climate conference — was significant. Coming from a figure with direct negotiating experience and credibility on both sides of the Atlantic, his assessment was widely reported and contributed to the gloomy mood surrounding international climate diplomacy in the wake of the election results.

The 2010 Midterm Elections and Climate Policy

The November 2010 midterm elections represented a dramatic reversal for the Democratic Party and for the Obama administration's legislative agenda. The Republican Party's gain of 63 House seats was the largest midterm swing in more than 70 years, erasing the substantial Democratic majority that had been in place since the 2008 elections and handing Republicans the speakership and committee chairmanships.

For climate policy, the elections confirmed what many in the Senate had already signalled — that comprehensive climate legislation including a cap-and-trade system was dead for the foreseeable future. The Waxman-Markey bill, which had passed the House in June 2009 with its significant forest offset provisions, had never been brought to a vote in the Senate. After the elections, the prospect of a Senate vote on comparable legislation became essentially zero.

Many of the new Republican members had campaigned on explicit opposition to the "job-killing cap-and-trade" legislation, framing climate policy as an economic threat rather than an environmental necessity. Several prominent Republicans who had previously supported market-based climate solutions, including Senators who had co-sponsored earlier cap-and-trade proposals, retreated from those positions under pressure from the Tea Party movement and conservative base voters.

Implications for the Cancun Climate Talks

The Cancun climate conference, scheduled for late November and early December 2010, now faced the challenge of maintaining momentum in international climate diplomacy in a dramatically changed political environment. Negotiators who had been building their strategies around the assumption that US domestic legislation was coming — and that this would enable the US to make more ambitious international commitments — had to rapidly recalibrate.

The Mexican hosts of COP16 worked to frame Cancun as an opportunity to make incremental but real progress on specific technical issues, rather than seeking a comprehensive agreement of the kind that had eluded negotiators at Copenhagen. This more modest ambition, while disappointing to climate advocates, proved to be the right strategic approach. The Cancun Agreements, adopted at the end of the conference, included important decisions on forests, adaptation, and climate finance.

For forests, the change in US political circumstances actually had limited short-term impact on the REDD+ negotiations, which were proceeding on a technical track driven primarily by developing forest countries and European donors. The US had been a supporter of REDD+ but was not the primary driver of the negotiations. The Cancun decisions on REDD+ — including the adoption of safeguards and the framework for national forest monitoring — reflected a genuine international consensus that held even in the changed political environment.

Finding a Path Forward Without US Leadership

The dimming of prospects for comprehensive US climate legislation forced a fundamental rethink about how the international community could achieve meaningful climate action without the full engagement of the world's largest economy and historical largest emitter. Several paths forward were identified by negotiators, analysts, and advocates in the weeks following the US elections.

One approach was to focus on what the US executive could do without Congressional action — through the Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants and other major sources. This approach, which the Obama administration ultimately pursued through the Clean Power Plan and other regulatory initiatives, could deliver significant domestic emission reductions without new legislation.

Another approach was to build the international climate regime around what was achievable given US constraints, creating a framework of nationally determined commitments that could accommodate the US without requiring Senate ratification. This approach eventually found its fullest expression in the Paris Agreement of 2015, which was specifically designed to be implementable as an executive action.

For forest conservation specifically, the analysis suggested that bilateral agreements between willing donor countries and forest nations could continue regardless of the state of US domestic legislation. Norway's forest partnerships with Indonesia, Brazil, and other countries did not depend on a US cap-and-trade system creating demand for forest carbon credits. They demonstrated that ambitious forest conservation finance was achievable through official development assistance channels even without the US.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who is John Prescott and why were his climate views significant?+

John Prescott served as Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom under Tony Blair from 1997 to 2007, making him one of the most senior figures in British government during the pivotal period when climate change rose to the top of the international political agenda. His significance in climate policy derives not only from his governmental role but from his direct involvement in the negotiations that produced the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.

At the Kyoto climate conference, Prescott played a key role in brokering the compromises — particularly on the flexibility mechanisms including the Clean Development Mechanism and emissions trading — that allowed the Protocol to be agreed. This hands-on experience in multilateral climate diplomacy gave him credibility as a commentator on the prospects for international climate agreements, and his views were taken seriously by both advocates and opponents of binding climate commitments.

Prescott remained active on climate issues after leaving government, taking on roles in international climate advocacy and continuing to comment publicly on the state of negotiations. His willingness to speak bluntly about political obstacles to climate action — as he did in the wake of the 2010 US midterm elections — made him a notable voice in the debate over what was achievable in international climate diplomacy given the political constraints facing the Obama administration.

His assessment of the post-election landscape was coloured by his experience of seeing the Kyoto Protocol fail to deliver on its potential partly because the US never ratified it. Having invested heavily in securing US participation in the Kyoto framework, only to see the Senate reject ratification and the subsequent Bush administration withdraw from the agreement, Prescott understood from personal experience how American domestic politics could undermine international climate diplomacy.

What happened in the 2010 US midterm elections and how did it affect climate policy?+

The 2010 US midterm elections resulted in a dramatic shift in the balance of power in Congress. The Republican Party gained 63 seats in the House of Representatives — the largest gain by any party in a midterm election since 1938 — regaining control of the chamber from the Democrats. In the Senate, Republicans gained 6 seats, significantly narrowing the Democratic majority and further reducing the prospects for passing major legislation.

The elections were widely interpreted as a referendum on the Obama administration's domestic agenda, including the Affordable Care Act and the economic stimulus package. However, they also had profound implications for climate policy. The Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill, which had passed the House in June 2009 with significant forest offset provisions, had already stalled in the Senate before the elections. After the Republican gains, any prospect of comprehensive climate legislation was effectively eliminated for the remainder of Obama's first term.

Many of the newly elected Republican members had campaigned on explicit opposition to climate legislation, in some cases questioning the scientific consensus on human-caused climate change. This shift in the composition of Congress made it not only politically impossible to pass new climate legislation but also created pressure to roll back existing regulations and funding for clean energy programs.

The international consequences were immediate and severe. The Obama administration had been arguing in climate negotiations that domestic legislation was coming and that other countries should make comparable commitments in expectation of US action. With that expectation eliminated, the foundation of the US negotiating position was undermined. Other major economies, which had been watching whether the US would follow through on its Copenhagen commitments, drew the obvious conclusion about the limits of American climate ambition in the near term.

What is the relationship between US domestic politics and international climate agreements?+

The relationship between US domestic politics and the prospects for effective international climate agreements is one of the most consequential and frustrating features of global climate diplomacy. As the world's largest historical emitter and the dominant global economic and military power, the United States has an outsized influence on international climate negotiations. When the US is engaged and willing to make ambitious commitments, it tends to catalyse action by others; when it retreats, the architecture of international cooperation is weakened.

The constitutional requirement for Senate ratification of international treaties — by a two-thirds supermajority — has repeatedly constrained US participation in international climate frameworks. The Senate rejected the Kyoto Protocol before the Clinton administration submitted it for ratification, and the Obama administration made a deliberate decision not to seek Senate ratification of the Copenhagen Accord, instead treating US climate commitments as executive actions under existing law.

The design of the Paris Agreement in 2015 was significantly influenced by the need to secure US participation without a Senate ratification vote. By structuring the agreement around nationally determined contributions rather than internationally prescribed targets, and by treating the core commitment as an obligation to set targets and report progress rather than an obligation to meet specific emission levels, the agreement's architects created a framework that the Obama administration could join as an executive action.

However, this design also made the agreement vulnerable to reversal by subsequent administrations, as the Trump administration demonstrated by announcing a withdrawal from Paris in 2017 (later reversed by the Biden administration in 2021). The volatility of US climate commitments across administrations creates profound uncertainty for international partners and for the long-term architecture of global climate cooperation.

What were the expectations for the Cancun climate talks in 2010?+

The COP16 climate conference in Cancun, Mexico, held in December 2010, took place in the difficult aftermath of the Copenhagen summit, which had failed to produce the legally binding agreement that many had hoped for and left the international climate process in a state of uncertainty. Expectations for Cancun were therefore carefully managed — rather than seeking another grand bargain, negotiators focused on consolidating progress on specific technical issues and rebuilding confidence in the UNFCCC process.

For forests, Cancun represented an opportunity to formalise the REDD+ framework that had been under development since 2007. The negotiations aimed to agree on the key elements of REDD+ including environmental and social safeguards, national forest monitoring system requirements, and the phased approach to implementation. These technical decisions, while less dramatic than a binding emission reduction agreement, were critical for creating the institutional foundation for large-scale forest conservation finance.

The political mood going into Cancun was subdued by the results of the US midterm elections, which confirmed that comprehensive US climate legislation was off the table. However, some negotiators argued that this clarification of the US domestic situation, while disappointing, at least removed uncertainty about whether the US Congress would pass legislation, allowing the international community to plan around what the US executive could actually deliver.

The Cancun Agreements ultimately achieved more than many expected in the difficult political environment, adopting a comprehensive package of decisions on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, and forests. The REDD+ framework was formalised, the Green Climate Fund was established, and the overall architecture of the post-Kyoto climate regime was advanced. While the agreements fell far short of delivering the binding targets needed to limit warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees, they represented genuine progress in keeping the international process moving.

Can international climate agreements work without full US participation?+

The question of whether effective international climate action is possible in the absence of full US commitment has been debated since the Senate rejected the Kyoto Protocol in the late 1990s. The evidence from that period suggests that while the absence of US participation significantly weakens any international agreement, it does not make all progress impossible — Europe, Japan, and other countries continued to implement Kyoto Protocol commitments even without the US.

The argument that binding international agreements are impossible without US participation reflects the reality that the US accounts for a large share of global emissions and that its absence from any compliance framework creates competitive disadvantage concerns for industries in countries that do participate. However, this argument has become less compelling as the economic competitiveness of clean energy has improved and as China and other major developing country emitters have made increasingly ambitious climate commitments.

The Paris Agreement has demonstrated that it is possible to construct an international framework that includes the US without requiring Senate ratification, using the structure of nationally determined contributions and executive commitments. However, the Trump administration's withdrawal from Paris demonstrated the vulnerability of this approach to political change. Achieving the depth of decarbonisation needed to meet Paris targets will require institutional and legislative changes in the US that are more durable than executive actions.

For forests specifically, bilateral agreements between individual donor countries and tropical forest nations — funded through official development assistance rather than compliance carbon markets — have continued to deliver conservation finance even during periods of US disengagement from multilateral climate frameworks. Norway, the UK, Germany, and other countries have maintained forest conservation programmes that demonstrate the possibility of meaningful action outside the UNFCCC process, though at a scale that remains far below what global forest conservation requires.